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DIANA HURWITZ*

Fishing for Compromises through
NAFTA and Environmental
Dispute-Settlement: The
Tuna-Dolphin Controversy
ABSTRACT
The conflict between tuna fishing practices and dolphin protection
epitomizes the antagonism between environmentalists and free trade
advocates. The history of the tuna-dolphin conflict and the different
perspectives of the parties show that traditionaldispute-settlement
procedures, particularly those of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), are unacceptablefor solving complex international disputes. This article examines the potential of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its Supplemental
Agreements to resolve the tuna-dolphin conflict. The conclusion is
that the NAFTA Supplemental Agreements create a framework for
solution by bringingall of the internationalactors together through
a mutually agreed-upon commitment to environmental cooperation.
Thus, NAFTA can institutionalizeproceduresfor the resolution of
trade and environmental disputes and be a model for structuring
multilateral trade agreements.
INTRODUCTION

A quick trip to the tuna aisle of any supermarket in the United
States will leave consumers face to face with an array of brand-name
labels that share one characteristic: stamped on each is a dolphin wearing
a huge grin and sporting a brightly-colored life preserver on which the
words "dolphin-safe" are inscribed. And yet, these simple labels mask the
complexity of an underlying controversy. They reflect the "tuna-dolphin
conflict" that has become a salient issue in the ongoing debate between
environmental protection and international trade.'
This type of debate has become commonplace in recent years.
Free trade advocates feel that allowing the market to set prices through
the opening of national economies and unhindered trade will help
strengthen the economies of developing countries. They argue that
* Diana Hurwitz is a Market Practice Specialist with Brown Brothers Harriman & Co.,
Boston. She has a M.A. in Latin American Studies, 1994, Stanford University and a B.A. in
Political Science, 1991, Colgate University.
1. Peter Behr, Environmentalists Find NAFTA Is No Easy Call: National Groups Remain
Sharply Divided, WASH. PosT, Aug. 24, 1993, at Cl.
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environmental degradation is linked to poverty; thus, as developing
countries get richer through free trade, the world environment will
improve. On the other side of the debate, environmentalists advocate the
use of trade restrictions to induce enforcement of environmental
protection laws.
Market liberalization has been pursued by free traders primarily
through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),2 which
attempts to diminish protectionist trade barriers throughout the world.3
The tuna-dolphin conflict peaked in the GATT international trade
dispute-resolution panel in 1991. However despite a formal panel ruling
on this issue, the distinction between environmental protection laws and
protectionist trade barriers is still blurred:
Throughout the industrialized world, thie environment is no
longer perceived as merely a scientific and technical issue but
as one that is intertwined with other central issues in world
politics: the future of North-South relations, the international
system of resource production and use, the liberalization of
world trade, and even East-West relations and the meaning of
national and international security issues.4
Thus, understanding the tuna-dolphin conflict and finally resolving this
ongoing controversy could facilitate the creation of a framework for the
eventual harmonization of trade and environment issues. However, the
tuna-dolphin conflict is a complicated matter with a long history of
disagreement.
On September 7, 1990, the U.S. government implemented an
import embargo on tuna caught by the Mexican tuna-fishing fleet.
According to this court order, the Mexican vessels were not meeting the
dolphin-mortality quotas established by the U.S. Marine Mammal
Protection Act of 1972, as amended.' Imports of tuna from Panama,
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Vanuatu were also terminated.6 Sixty days after
the original embargoes, the U.S. government followed with a secondary
ban on imports of tuna from 20 nations that import Mexican tuna as a
raw material, package it, and export it to the United States.' As a result

2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signatureOct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts.
5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
3. ROBERT H. GIRLING, MULTINATIONAL INSTUTIONS AND THE THIRD WORLD: MANAGEMENT, DEBT, AND TRADE CoNFLIcTs IN THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 62-69 (1985).

4. GARETH PORTER & JANET W. BROWN, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLmCs 1 (1991).
5. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as

amended at 16 US.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1988 & Supp. 1995)).
6. This article concentrates on U.S. embargoes on imports of Mexican tuna.
7. David C. Scott, U.S. Tuna Ban May Snag Trade Talks With Mexico: Mexico Says U.S.
Environmental Rules Violate Principleof Open Markets, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 7,
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of these embargoes, Mexico has been effectively shut out of one of the
largest tuna markets in the world.8
The United States and Mexico share a 2,000-mile border over
which thousands of people and products flow daily. This stretch of land
is the only area of the world in which an advanced industrial country
shares an extensive border with a less developed country. Given the
cultural and historical differences between these two countries, not to
mention clear asymmetries of power, the possibilities for conflict are
great. However, the United States and Mexico also share strong and
increasing environmental, social, and political ties. Most notably, the
economies of these two nations and Canada have recently been cemented
together by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),9 which
took effect on January 1, 1994. This agreement created the largest trading
block in the world-with a $6 trillion market.1"
Thus, the tuna-dolphin controversy has created animosity
between the United States and Mexico at a time when the increasing
interdependence of these bordering nations necessitates multilateral
collaboration on mutually important policy issues. Beyond its bilateral
importance:
rooted in the tuna-dolphin controversy are the major philosophical and environmental questions of the day. Preservation
versus management; the rights of human beings versus the
rights of other creatures; the needs of many versus the
demands of the few; feeding the hungry versus conserving
natural resources; and one nation's power position versus
another's attempts to rise from poverty.1
A review of the history of this conflict and the different perspectives on this issue reveals that traditional dispute-settlement procedures
have been inadequate in resolving this disagreement and therefore must
be improved. In particular, the GATT conflict-resolution panel has failed
to provide an adequate solution. The embargoes and the animosity
among the various parties in this conflict act as a thorn in the side of
policy makers seeking collaboration today. We must look elsewhere for
a remedy.

1990, at 6.
8. In 1989, Mexico exported 17.1% of its tuna catch to the United States; one year after the
embargo was implemented, this figure fell to zero. Id.
9. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Canada-Mexico, Dec. 17,1992 (enteredinto
force Jan. 1, 1994).
10. Juanita Darling et al., Can Mexico Clean Up Its Act?, L. A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1991, at Al.
11. Sadl Alvarez-Borrego, The Tuna and Dolphin Controversy, 31 UC MExus NEws 8, 13

(1993).
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NAFTA provides two potential avenues for solving this dilemma:
a framework for dispute-settlement and a trilateral Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC). However, the wording of the
Supplemental Agreements to NAFTA creates substantial obstacles to
bringing the tuna-dolphin issue to the dispute-resolution panel. Thus, by
bringing together the various players in international disputes under the
cloak of a mutually agreed-upon commitment to environmental cooperation, the CEC could provide the better means for resolution of the
tuna-dolphin conflict.
Economic integration among countries at divergent levels of
economic and political development inevitably produces the potential for
conflict on a variety of issues. However, a solution that can effectively
bring an end to the unilateral U.S. embargoes against Mexico while also
diminishing Mexican dolphin-mortality rates to zero is both vitally
necessary and within our reach. If properly utilized, NAFTA can act as
a major stepping-stone in institutionalizing procedures for the resolution.
of current trade and environmental disputes. Moreover, in addition to
ending the bilateral tuna-dolphin conflict, NAFTA can also act as a model
for structuring future multilateral trade agreements in an environmentally
sustainable manner.
A RECENT HISTORY OF THE TUNA-DOLPHIN
CONTROVERSY
The MarineMammal ProtectionAct of 1972: Congressional
Amendments and Judicial Battles
The eastern tropical Pacific (ETP) is an important tuna-fishing
sector ranging from Baja California to Peru and from the coast to 150
degrees west in latitude. In the past, the ETP has been one of the most
productive tuna-fishing bodies in the world." Fishermen have traditionally used a technique called "purse seining" to catch yellowfin tuna
in this area. The tuna is then canned and sold as light tuna in supermarkets.
Purse seine nets are approximately one mile long and 600 feet
deep. The most effective means of catching sexually mature yellowfin
tuna with a purse seine net is through the "dolphin-fishing" technique,
which capitalizes on the fact that herds of dolphins in this region tend to
swim above schools of yellowfin tuna. Thus, in order to maximize the
tuna catch, fishermen spot the dolphins as they come to the surface to
breathe and set the purse seine nets around the dolphin herds. In the

12. Id. at 8.
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process of gathering tuna in this fashion, the nets snare dolphins by their
snouts or flippers and they drown. 3 The dead dolphins are not sold or
humans; they are thrown over the side of the fishing vessels as
eaten 1by
4
waste.

Years of domestic legislation, judicial battle, and international
confrontation have contributed to the drastic decline in the incidental
killing of dolphins from tuna-fishing. The Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) of 1972 was created to protect "certain species and population
stocks of marine mammals [that] are, or may be, in danger of extinction
or depletion as a result of man's activities."'" This law specifically aims
for a zero mortality rate of dolphins, which have been targeted as a
mammal in need of protection. 16 Early on, MMPA proponents responded to U.S. government inaction in enforcing this law by lobbying for
legislative amendments creating stricter regulations. When legislative
amendments failed to produce enforcement, environmentalists took the
matter to the courts. In recent years, implementation of the MMPA has
played a major role in lowering domestic and international dolphin-mortality. While tuna-fishing killed more than 500,000 dolphins in the ETP
1960,'" the estimated dolphin-mortality for 1993 is less than 10,000,
representing a decrease of 98 percent.'
While the MMPA was amended several times during the 1980s,
two fundamental changes in this law were passed in 1984 and 1988.
Congress drafted the 1984 amendment in response to the recognition that
foreign tuna-fishing by Mexico, Venezuela, Vanuatu, Ecuador, and
Panama was causing the majority of dolphin deaths. In particular,
Congress noted that these nations did not implement any national or
international regulation programs to protect dolphins, and that their boats
contained fewer "observers" than did U.S. vessels. 9 The 1984 amendment inserted "comparability provisions" in the MMPA, stating that
nations desiring to export tuna to the United States had to implement

13. Review of the Administration's Dolphin Protection Proposal and Discussion of Options
Available to Help Reduce Dolphin Mortality: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Fisheries and
Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
House of Representatives, H.R. REP. 5417, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 113 (1992), reprinted in 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2919 [hereinafter Hearing].
14. WHERE HAVE ALL THE DOLPHINS GONE? (The Video Project 1990).
15. 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1972).

16. Id.
17. NANCY BOcKSTAEL & IVAR STRAND, FREE TRADE AND GLOBAL RESOURcES: THE CASE

OF PROTECTED MARINE SPECIES 8 (Inter-American Development Bank and United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Working Paper No. 49, 1993).
18. Jan Gilbreath, Fish or Foul?, 4.6 HEMISFILE 11 (1993).
19. Observers are typically biologists who monitor the techniques used to catch tuna and
count the number of dolphins killed per shoal of tuna netted.
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dolphin-conservation procedures and maintain low dolphin-mortality
rates comparable to the United States. The Commerce Department of the
United States would decide which nations met these criteria."
By 1988, little progress had been made in the implementation of
the MMPA-mandated embargoes. Congress reacted by stripping the
Commerce Department of its authority to decide whether nations were
meeting the comparability provisions and establishing specific dolphinmortality quotas for foreign fleets. The U.S. dolphin-mortality quota
remained 20,500 per year as it had been since 1980,2" but in 1989, the
U.S. government stipulated that nations wishing to export tuna to the
United States could kill no more than twice as many dolphins as the U.S.
tuna fleet. As of 1990, the quota was set at 1.25 times the number of
dolphins killed by U.S. vessels for the same yearP In addition, foreign
boats were required to abide by four restrictions: the discontinuance of
"sundown sets," which typically kill many dolphins; the termination of
encircling dolphins; the assurance that an Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC) inspector would be present on all tuna vessels in
order to monitor the number of dolphins killed; and the termination of
the use of explosives to herd dolphins during sets.'
Yet, despite the existence of such formal legislation, no penalties
were imposed on nations violating the maximum dolphin-mortality limits
set by the MMPA. Since the government was clearly not going to enforce
its own legislation, a San Francisco-based environmental group decided
that it would. In 1990, the Earth Island Institute, which had been
advocating zero mortality rates for dolphins for years, sued the U.S.
government for failing to enforce the MMPA.' The Earth Island
Institute won the case, and on September 7, 1990, tuna-import embargoes
were first imposed against Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, and
Vanuatu. Within a week of imposing sanctions, however, the Commerce
Department lifted the bans on all of these countries except Panama, based
on estimated dolphin-mortality statistics for the first six months of the
year. San Francisco District Court Judge Thelton Henderson then ruled
that figures for the full year must be utilized to establish whether a
nation was in violation of legislated quotas.' He reinstated the embargoes to be retroactive to October 12, 1990.26

20. David Phillips, Dolphinsand GATT, in THE CASE AGAINST FREE TRADE: GAiT, NAFTA,
AND THE GLOBALIZATION OF CORPORATE POWER 134 (Ralph Nader ed., 1993).

21. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Congress Passes Historic Dolphin-ProtectionLaw, 8.1 EARTH ISLAND J. 8 (1993).
Hearing, supra note 13, at 137.
Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
746 F. Supp. at 974.
Scott, supra note 7, at 6.
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The U.S. government, displeased with Judge Henderson's ruling,
appealed the case to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
unanimously that the tuna-import embargoes were required by law.'
Then, sixty days after the original embargoes were reinstated, a secondary ban on tuna imports from countries buying Mexican or any "dolphin
unsafe" tuna and re-exporting it to the United States barred the import
of tuna from more than twenty additional counties.' If there had been
any doubt, it was now clear that Mexican tuna would not reach the U.S.
market by any means.
The GATT Panel Decision
On January 25, 1991, the Mexican government challenged the
legality of the MMPA through the GATT dispute-resolution panel.'
GATT serves as the primary international trade agreement in existence
today, in which both the United States (1948) and Mexico (1986) are
members. While its primary focus is on facilitating trade liberalization
among nations, the GATT also contains a dispute-settlement panel to
resolve international trade disagreements. °
On August 16, 1991, the GATT panel ruled in favor of Mexico,
while specifically allowing the United States to use voluntary labeling for
"dolphin-friendly" tuna, as long as it was applied evenly to imports and
American-caught tuna.31 "Dolphin-safe" or "dolphin-friendly" tuna, as
defined by the U.S. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act,32
includes any tuna not harvested by using purse seine nets and tuna not
caught with high-seas drift nets.'
The GATT panel's decision rested on many criteria,, but the two
most controversial and fundamental principles invoked were: Imported
products must be treated in a manner that is no less favorable than that
of domestic products, and the method of production or "production
process" cannot be taken into account in determining equal treatment

27. Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Phillips,
supra note 20, at 134.
28. Scott, supra note 7, at 6.
29. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United
States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (Aug. 16, 1991) [hereinafter Panel
Report]; see also Phillips, supra note 20, at 135.
30. Barbara Stallings, InternationalInfluence on Economic Policy: Debt, Stabilization, and
StructuralReform, in THE POLMCS OF EcONOMIc ADJUSTMENT 80 (Stephan Haggard & Robert
R. Kaufman eds., 1992).
31. Panel Report, supra note 29, at 1622; see also Phillips, supra note 20, at 136.
32. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (Supp. 1995).
33. BOCKSTAEL & STRAND, supra note 17, at 35.
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under GATT regulations.' In addition, subsections (b) and (g) of Article
XX of GATT were ruled not to apply to this situation, which effectively
meant that the protection of animal life or the conservation of natural
resources are justifiable trade barriers only when they occur within a
state's own borders. 5
Despite this favorable outcome, former President Salinas de
Gortari of Mexico did not pursue the implementation of the GATT ruling
36
and, to date, no further GATT action has been taken on this decision.
It appears that Salinas did not want environmental issues, such as the
tuna-dolphin panel ruling, obstructing the prospect of a $6 trillion North
American market through NAFTA. As Juanita Darling, a reporter for the
Los Angeles Times, wrote at the time, "Salinas sees a trade pact as his best
weapon for fighting Mexico's nagging inflation rate, widespread
unemployment, poverty, and mounting trade imbalance."37 Given the
amount of political collateral invested in NAFTA by the Mexicans, failure
to secure this agreement would have significantly damaged Salinas'
personal reputation, not to mention the harsh repercussions that a
"no-NAFTA" outcome would have had for the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) presidential candidate in the 1994 election. Thus, while
Salinas might have preferred U.S. markets to be opened to Mexican tuna,
the adverse consequences of forcing the United States to retract the
embargoes might not have been worth the fight.
To lessen tension after the GATT ruling, Salinas unveiled a
ten-point program on September 24, 1991, specifically designed to protect
dolphins. This program represented an advance in two respects. First,
international inspectors would be present on every tuna vessel of the
Mexican fleet, as contrasted with previous regulations allowing them on
only one-third of the boats. In addition, Salinas set aside $1 million for
research into dolphin-safe fishing practices.' While there have been no
high technology breakthroughs in stopping dolphin deaths from

34. Panel Report, supra note 29, at 1617.
35. Id. at 1620, 1621; see also Matthew H. Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law and the
Environment: A Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92
COLUMBIA L. REv. 2098, 2125 (1992).
36. There was, however, a GATT panel ruling in May, 1994, on the secondary tuna
embargoes that the United States imposed on nations that import "dolphin-unsafe tuna" and
re-export it to the United States. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Panel
Settlement Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (June
1994). In this decision, the GATT ruled in favor of the European Economic Community by
stating that the U.S. secondary embargoes are a violation of GATr. Donald M. Goldberg,
GATT Tuna-Dolphin II: Environmental Protection Continues to Clash with Free Trade, 2 CENTER
FOR INT'L ENVTL. L. BRIEF 1 (1994).
37. Darling et al., supra note 10, at Al.
38. Id. at D6.
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tuna-fishing since the drafting of this proposal, the mere presence of
inspectors has undoubtedly contributed to the decreasing Mexican
dolphin-mortality rates by encouraging Mexican fisherman to be more
careful about killing dolphins.
The U.S. Congress followed these Mexican efforts by wielding a
major blow to any hopes that the tuna embargoes might soon be lifted.
To further protect the dolphins, on October 8, 1992, Congress passed the
International Dolphin Conservation Act,' which amended the MMPA.
This unilateral law strengthened regulations on both domestic and
foreign tuna fleets that want to sell tuna in the United States. Under this
law, dolphin kills by U.S. fleets were not to exceed 800 total for the
period January 1, 1993 to March 1, 1994, while the quota thereafter was
to be zero. Regarding foreign fleets, this legislation authorized the
Secretary of State to negotiate a global moratorium on the setting of tuna
nets on dolphins:
[The law] imposes strict non-discretionary embargoes and
sanctions against countries failing to abide by the global
moratorium. These will include fish product sanctions that, for
example, could reach $100 million per year if Mexico pledges
to enact a moratorium, but then fails to abide by its
pledge.'
Mexico had not pledged to participate in this global
As of May 1994,
41
moratorium.
Given the sharp drop in the number of dolphin deaths caused by
Mexican tuna harvesters over the last decade, it is likely that the
quota-based embargoes on Mexican tuna would have been lifted.
However, the International Dolphin Conservation Act squelches the
possibility of ending the bans. On March 1, 1994, the moratorium-based
embargoes of Mexican tuna went into effect. Thus, it appears that the
conflict and animosity surrounding the tuna-dolphin controversy will
continue until an adequate dispute-resolution apparatus is established
and implemented.
DIVERGENT PERSPECTIVES
The perspectives of the primary actors involved in this dispute
are quite disparate, and can be broadly categorized under the rubric of
39. International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-523, 106 Stat. 3425
(codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1411-17 (Supp. 1995)).
40. Congress Passes Historic Dolphin-ProtectionLaw, supra note 22, at 8.
41. Carlos R. Martinez, Mexico's Tuna Fishing Policy Defended, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992,
at D5.
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two distinct-and polarized-groups. On one side of the fence, "staunch"
U.S. environmental groups, the U.S. Congress, and U.S. cannery
corporations have supported continued embargoes. In the opposing
corner, the Bush Administration, moderate U.S. environmental activists,
and the Mexican government and tuna fishermen have opposed the
embargoes.42 While the views regarding the embargoes are diametrically
opposed, one major area of agreement exists: all of the various players in
this conflict find the GATT panel decision to be an inadequate resolution
of the dispute.
Group A: Save the Dolphins at Any Cost
Pro-EmbargoEnvironmentalists
Staunch environmental groups, such as the Earth Island Institute,
believe that bans on Mexican tuna should continue until Mexico meets
the requirements of the International Dolphin Conservation Act. They
defend embargoes as a right of the United States "to preserve and
conserve wildlife wherever it is located, with respect to any item, product
or resource that enters into the United States."43 David Phillips, director
of Earth Island Institute, explains this perspective by stating that "it is the
responsibility of the United States to make sure that our markets do not
dictate the destruction of the planet."4
Curiously, however, despite this activism among U.S. environmental groups, their analogue across the border-the Mexican environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs)-have remained
conspicuously silent during the tuna-dolphin debate. There are three
main reasons for this inaction and lack of transnational alliance. First, the
1988 presidential elections left Mexican environmental organizations
extremely fragmented, with some supporting the opposition Party of the
Democratic Revolution (PRD) candidate, while others favored the

42. As with several other environmental issues, the Clinton-Gore Administration has
taken a low profile approach to the tuna-dolphin controversy. No public statements worthy
of note have been made by Vice President Albert Gore on the tuna-dolphin conflict. Many
predicted that Gore would take an active pro-environment stand on issues of trade and
environmental conflicts once elected, but, surprisingly, Gore has chosen to pursue other
issues with more vehemence. Interview with William Reilly, 1994 Payne Lecturer, Stanford
University, in Palo Alto, CA (May 10, 1994).
43. Judge R. Kenton Musgrave, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series, NAFTA
and the Environment: The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994). See also
Judge R. Kenton Musgrave, The Gatt-Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. REFSoURCES
J. 957 (1993).
44. David Phillips, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series, NAFTA and the
Environment: The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994).
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government's PRI candidate.' Moreover, after Salinas was elected, some
authors suggested that "critical ENGOs were intentionally weakened by
the PRI government through the use of a number of strategies of
control. " ' Thus, even those groups that supported the embargoes did
not have the power to fight the opposition of the Salinas government and
side with U.S. ENGOs.
Second, some believe that U.S. and Mexican ENGOs have
experienced a "fall out" in recent years. According to Alberto Sz~kely,
Mexican representative to the International Law Commission, Mexican
ENGOs have declined to side with their U.S. counterparts because of the
"incredible discrepancy of interests" between the two, especially
throughout the NAFTA negotiations. In his view, the U.S. ENGOs are
more concerned with U.S. environmental protection and border issues
than with environmental problems within Mexico. Mexican ENGOs, on
the other hand, are worried about the environmental future of Mexico as
a whole, and the possibility of their nation becoming one huge maquiladora.47
The third, and perhaps most compelling, explanation for inaction
is that Mexican ENGOs do not want to appear to be siding with U.S.
organizations on this question, which touches upon sensitive issues of
sovereignty. Historically, Mexicans have been concerned about the United
States overstepping its territorial boundaries, and infringing on the rights
of Mexicans to govern themselves and protect their own interests. Thus,
to paraphrase Sz~kely, if there is any issue in which public sentiment will
be aroused in support of the Mexican government, it is one such as the
tuna-dolphin conflict, which Mexicans perceive as a threat to their

45. Maria-Pilar Garcia-Guadilla, Identity, Strategy and Symbolic Effectiveness: The Venezuelan
Environmental Movement, 12:4-7 INT'L J. Soc. & Soc. POL'Y 53 (1992).
46. JOLLE DEMMERS

& BARBARA HOGENIooM, POPULAR ORGANIZATION AND PARTY

DOMINANCE: THE POLITICAL ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL NGOs IN MEXIco 69 (1992).
47. Alberto Sz~kely, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series, NAFTA and the
Environment: The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994). Maquiladoras
are industrial plants located in Mexico that can import components into Mexico duty-free,
assemble these components, and re-export the final product to the United States where
duties are levied only on the value added by operations performed in Mexico. Sz~kely's
view is obviously very rigid. Today, many U.S. ENGOs, such as Greenpeace, have
established bases in Mexico and throughout Latin America. In addition, local ENGOs in
Mexico have allied with larger international organizations in an attempt to promote
environmental conservation. While Mexican ENGOs do not always agree with the platforms
espoused by all U.S. ENGOs (particularly since the U.S. ENGOs do not share the same opinions on all environmental issues themselves), there are areas of mutual concern and
cooperation. The tuna-dolphin controversy does not seem to be one of those areas, although
undoubtedly there are some environmental activists in Mexico who wish to see dolphin-protection improved.
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sovereignty because of U.S. attempts to unilaterally "police" Mexican
fishing.
The U.S. Congress
Even without the support of Mexican ENGOs, however, U.S.
ENGOs have been successful in inciting public outrage on behalf of
dolphins. For example, U.S. citizens reacted strongly to a videotape that
aired on CBS, ABC, and CNN in spring of 1988, which captured the
details of a dolphin slaughter by a Panamanian tuna vessel. Floods of
letters were sent to both Congress and to the director of Heinz Corporation (producer of StarKist tuna), demanding the termination of this
killing.' With public sentiment aroused regarding the protection of
dolphins, members of Congress supported the zero-mortality goal by
passing numerous dolphin-protection amendments to the MMPA. In this
way, U.S. environmental groups have received substantial congressional
support for their cause.
The U.S. Tuna Canneries
In addition to members of Congress, tuna canneries striving to
cater to consumer preferences also reacted to public alarm over dolphin
deaths. Even prior to the official U.S. embargoes, StarKist, Chicken of the
Sea, and Bumble Bee all commenced a boycott of Mexican tuna to
reassure the public that the United States could continue to buy tuna
without fear of condoning the killing of dolphins. As Kathleen Bates,
consumer affairs representative of San Diego, California's Van Camp
Seafood Company wrote:
Our 100 percent "dolphin-safe" policy was announced and
implemented on April 12, 1990. On that date, Van Camp
Seafood (Chicken of the Sea brand) announced that effective
immediately, it and all its affiliates would not purchase tuna
from vessels that netted fish associated with dolphins. Van
Camp Seafood's purchasing policy requires that suppliers of
tuna provide certification that the vessel did not at any time
during its trip fish for tuna by setting its nets around dolphins.49
These seemingly "environmentally pure" goals of U.S. tuna
harvesters are questionable. Only after considerable interest group
48. Patrick Conner, The Conversion of StarKist, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1990, at This World.
49. Letter from Kathleen Bates, Consumer Affairs Representative, Van Camp Seafood
Company, Inc. (Chicken of the Sea) (Nov. 12, 1993) (on file with author).

Summer 19951

THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CONTROVERSY

pressure did the largest canneries yield to public demands to can
dolphin-safe tuna. The videotape of the Panamanian fishermen killing
dolphins played a large part in forcing the canneries to implement a
boycott. Adding to the pressure were the full-page advertisements that
Earth Island Institute placed in major newspapers, including The New
York Times, attacking Heinz's tuna-fishing policies.50 The final blow to
Heinz's policies was a public boycott of StarKist and other Heinz
products such as WeightWatchers. On April 12, 1990, Heinz publicly
announced its boycott of dolphin-unsafe tuna. The Heinz announcement
not only capitalized on environmental awareness but also dramatically
advanced the campaign to save the dolphins, by compelling rival tuna
canneries to go along. Thus, Heinz must be given credit for "creating a
new measure of corporate accountability against which all companies
may now be judged" and having the moral integrity and the environmental consciousness to be the first cannery to implement a dolphin-safe
policy proposal."'
The unusual "coalition of convenience" among U.S. ENGOs, the
U.S. Congress, and tuna-cannery corporations argues that, just as U.S.
fleets made substantial efforts in dolphin conservation, Mexico should be
forced to do the same, despite being a less developed country with fewer
resources available. The evidence (see Figure 1) indicates that U.S.
dolphin kills have diminished tremendously in the recent past, from
20,000 in 19792 to 1,004 in 1991.1 These numbers represent a decrease
of nearly 95 percent during the 12-year period. In addition, the number
of U.S. tuna-fishing boats in the ETP has dropped from 34 in 1986 to
four in 1993,' s with this number still in decline. The fleet has primarily
moved to the western tropical Pacific (WTP), where tuna are not believed
to swim with dolphins.'
Embargo advocates believe that these concrete measures are not
being reciprocated by Mexico. They feel that the 10-point Salinas proposal
57
to protect the dolphins was "only cosmetic, a face-saving measure.

50. Conner, supra note 48.
51. Id.

52. Hearing, supra note 13, at 115.
53. Phillips, supra note 20, at 135.
54. Hearing, supra note 13, at 115.
55. Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 10.

56. There is currently a debate as to whether dolphins swim with tuna only in the ETP.
Recent evidence suggests that the earlier consensus that such behavior was limited to the
ETP might be incorrect. If this evidence is accurate, it suggests that the U.S. Congress is
discriminating against Mexican fleets by banning imports of Mexican tuna while dolphins

continue to be killed by tuna fishermen in other areas of the world. Greenpeace, Dolphins,
Tuna and Free Trade: A Greenpeace Perspective 3 (1992).

57. Darling et al., supra note 10, at D6.

[Vol 35

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

Figure I

U.S. Dolphin KIll

---NNE
I.0

1979

1988

1989

1990

1991

Year
Som: Committeeom ha'bmtkMaive md Fidha is (1992), p. 115; Phifips (1993), p. 135

Summer 19951

THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CONTROVERSY

Placing observers on every ship is important, they argue, but it is only a
superficial measure, as is increasing spending on finding dolphin-safe
fishing practices. They feel that these changes will not immediately
impact the number of dolphins killed, and are ineffective attempts to
avoid further confrontation. In addition, groups favoring continued
embargoes feel that the recent decline in world dolphin-mortality rates,
from 130,000 in 1986 to an estimate of less than 10,000 in 1993, was
achieved without expensive alterations in fishing practices.' It is not a
question of acquiring some expensive, advanced technology in order to
diminish dolphin mortality, they argue; rather, it is a matter of employing
more careful methods. Being more cautious is not very expensive.
According to these critics, then, Mexico has no viable reason for not
meeting U.S. dolphin kill quotas.'
Finally, organizations supporting the tuna embargoes argue that
the GATT dispute-resolution panel decision set a dangerous precedent for
declaring several U.S. environmental laws "illegal" under GATT. Because
of its allegation that the United States was unfairly blocking trade, future
attempts to preserve the global commons-whether through laws
protecting oceans, forests, or elephants-may be disallowed.' Pro-embargo groups feel that this sort of unilateral U.S. action is essential in
forging international action to protect the environment and is necessary
to propel forward multilateral action. 61
Further, embargo supporters believe that the dispute-resolution
procedures established under GATT were fundamentally flawed and ill
suited for resolving complex environmental issues. Above all, they object
to the fact that three judges in Geneva largely removed from the
tuna-dolphin conflict came to a decision after holding secret proceedings
without the advice of experts on the environment.62 Thus, they argue,
the fact that GATT did not allow environmental groups to voice their
views and provide their expertise to the dispute-resolution panel means
that environmental concerns were not adequately considered, and
trade-restrictive environmental protection measures were disallowed.

58. Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 11.
59. Hearing, supra note 13, at 114. While it is true that the initial cost of being more
careful is not terribly high, the cost of moving from low dolphin kill rates to zero dolphin
deaths is considerably higher. In order to do this effectively, Mexican fleets would have to
convert the machinery of their boats in the ETP to that used for fishing on schools of tuna,
or other floating objects that tuna swim beneath (such as logs), rather than dolphins. Several
of these boats would also be forced to move to the WTP, a costly transfer.
60. Hilary F. French, GATT: Menace or Ally?, 6.5 WORLDWATCH 14 (1993).
61. Hilary F. French & Thomas Heller, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series,
NAFTA and the Environment: The Tuna-DolphinConflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994).
62. Phillips, supra note 20, at 135.
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Group B: Save the Dolphins, But Weigh Other Issues Too
Clearly, staunch environmental groups, the U.S. Congress, and
major canneries for U.S. tuna feel that the embargoes should continue
until Mexico has met all the requirements of U.S. legislation. Meanwhile,
the Bush Administration, other environmentalists, and the Mexican government and tuna fisheries have held a very different perspective. One
common link between these two otherwise irreconcilable views is
discontent with the GATT ruling.P
The Bush Administration
The Bush Administration actively opposed the embargoes on
imports of Mexican tuna because the bans on imports ignored the
political intricacies of the situation. The tuna-dolphin conflict became
salient just as the NAFTA negotiations began. Offending the Mexican
government and harming the Mexican economy at a time when the
United States sought Mexico's cooperation and support was not
considered to be a wise strategy by policy makers. Thus, the Administration actively opposed the embargoes by fighting the Earth Island Institute
in court." When the government lost, it appealed the case.' When the
appeal failed, Bush Administration officials told the Mexicans that "the
U.S. government will get the dolphin protection law weakened. "66 As
these events suggest, the growing interdependence between Mexico and
the United States prompted the Administration to search for a more
cooperative approach toward solving regional environmental issues.
While the stance of the Bush Administration with respect to the
embargoes was thus relatively straightforward, its attitude toward the
GATT ruling was more ambivalent. One would assume that those who
opposed embargoes of Mexican tuna would have supported an international ruling declaring embargoes to be an unfair barrier to trade that had
to be removed. However, the U.S. government was also publicly
committed to strengthening GATT. Thus, after the GATT decision was
announced, the Bush Administration was faced with a difficult choice:
vetoing the GATT ruling, accepting the GATT penalties and sanctions, or
trying to weaken the MMPA.67 Luckily for the Administration, it did not
have to make this choice. Instead, a fourth alternative was created:
Mexico did not pursue enforcement.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See supra note 42 for an explanation of the Clinton Administration position.
Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
Earth Island Institute v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
Jessica Mathews, Dolphins, Tuna and Free Trade, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at A21.
Phillips, supra note 20, at 137.
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Anti-Embargo Environmentalists
For reasons that differ from those of the Bush Administration,
many environmentalists also opposed continued embargoes. For example,
Greenpeace opposed the arbitrariness implied in the comparability
provisions of the MMPA and the quota-based embargoes, stating:
This is a double standard staggering in hypocrisy. The MMPA
limits the U.S. fleet to a blanket mortality "quota" of 20,500
dolphin kills per year, but bases "acceptable" mortality for
foreign fleets on the U.S. fleet's actual kill rate. That kill rate
changes from year to year because the dates used to make the
comparison as well as the number of sets made on dolphins
change. So, non-U.S. fleets have no constant standard to abide
by. In addition, there is nothing in the MMPA that prevents
the U.S. fleet from landinf tuna caught on dolphin in the U.S.
market from any source.
In addition, Greenpeace argued that discrimination against ETP tuna was
unjust, as setting on dolphins also occurs in the WTP, noting that:
...the marketing strategies of the big canners have centered
on high-priced "dolphin-safe" advertising campaigns such as
those of the Heinz Company and the Italian canners, or on
bragging about a blanket boycott on ETP tuna-and pushing
the lie that other fisheries are "dolphin-safe." What began as a
tool to help solve the problem has instead turned into a classic
"greenwashing" cover-up that actually perpetuates the problem.69
In a nutshell, Greenpeace and similar organizations saw the discrimination inherent in certain aspects of the MMPA and refused to take part in
it. While they may object to continued dolphin kills, they also object to
those rules which did not mandate uniform standards to legislate against
dolphin kills.
In addition, authors such as Jan Gilbreath, usually a pro-environmentalist, join Mexicans in arguing that the embargoes have been
excessive. As evidence, authors note that dolphin kills have diminished
tremendously in recent years, and the number of each dolphin species
has been stable or increasing since 19837 Gilbreath contends that
Mexican efforts have been extensive in this regard, and that the embar-

68. Greenpeace, supra note 56.

69. Id.
70. Hearing, supra note 13, at 118.
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goes should now be lifted.' Moreover, as noted at a recent environmentalist conference, many scientists consider the care of an entire ecosystem
to be more critical than the hyper-protection of one species.'
The Mexican Government and Mexican Tuna Fishermen
Most Mexicans agree with the sentiment of anti-embargo
environmentalists in the United States who feel the embargoes are
excessive. Mexicans were confused by the outcry over this non-endangered animal. Certainly, they have both conservationist and economic
reasons for wanting to reduce dolphin-mortality in their tuna-fishing
industry. On the one hand, an increasing population of environmentally
conscious individuals in Mexico undoubtedly believes that dolphin
species should not be eliminated. More pointedly, exclusion from the
lucrative American market, whether directly through primary embargoes
or indirectly through secondary embargoes, has also spurred Mexico's
efforts to redress this issue.
However, as a general principle, Mexicans oppose continued bans
on tuna imports to the United States for a variety of reasons. To begin
with, they argue that the tuna-dolphin conflict ultimately comes down to
a "humans versus dolphins" trade-off. Second, they feel that economic
asymmetries between the United States and Mexico have not been
considered in increasingly stringent U.S. legislation. Third, they contend
that the United States is using embargoes to create a non-tariff barrier to
trade that is fundamentally protectionist and damaging to Mexico's
national sovereignty. Moreover, losses to the Mexican industry have been
substantial. Finally, Mexicans are dissatisfied with the GATT panel
decision.
MEXICAN EFFORTS TO DIMINISH DOLPHIN KILLS
The Mexican tuna-fishing industry has been decreasing dolphin-mortality rates since before the tuna embargoes began. Mexican dolphin kill
rates declined more than 85 percent from 1986 to 1992." Mexican fleets
now kill fewer than one dolphin per shoal of tuna netted.74 Estimated
world dolphin-mortality statistics attest to this decline (see Figure 2). In
1989, between 97,000 and 102,000 dolphins died. By 1991, the figure was

71.
72.
73.
74.

Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 11.
Alvarez-Borrego, supra note 11, at 13.
Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 10.
Must Try Harder,EcONOMIsT, Aug. 21, 1993, at A22.
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down to 25,000. 7s The estimated figures for 1993 suggest that fewer than
10,000 dolphins died from tuna fishing around the world. 6
Mexican fishermen are now more careful about freeing dolphins.
They use "backing down" techniques to let dolphins out of the nets, and
speed boats and deep-sea divers to help spot and lead dolphins to safety.
In turn, their methods of tuna-fishing are also approved by the National
Academy of Sciences, and Mexico has been working with the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission to improve fishing practices." Today,
international monitors who observe fishing techniques and count dolphin
deaths are aboard every ship of the Mexican tuna-fishing fleet in the
ETP.8 Moreover, while the United States has moved most of its fleet to the
WTP or re-registered it internationally over a period of time, the U.S.
government has forced comparable standards on Mexico's tuna industry
within a short period.
Humans Versus Dolphins
At the same time that Mexicans have worked to diminish dolphin
kill rates, they have also worked to help feed their population. Tuna plays
a major role in the government's attempts to provide healthful food to those
with fewer financial resources. Mexicans feel that U.S. environmental
legislation protecting dolphins does not take these circumstances into
account.

In other words, Mexican officials feel that while dolphin safety is
important, other priorities should take precedence. In 1991, 17 million
Mexicans lived in extreme poverty. They could not afford fresh fish or
meat. In response to these resource deficiencies, Mexico has developed an
extensive domestic market for tuna in the last decade. Indeed, while Mexico
exports a great deal of tuna, about sixty percent of the harvest remains in
the country for domestic consumption. 79 This inexpensive form of
nutrition is vital to the survival of many in poverty. As one author noted:
Mexico does not have the dolphin-safe labels. Besides, consumers here don't care about the precise contents. What they see is
a can of food that costs less than 80 cents. Few Mexicans are
aware that dolphins suffer when yellowfin tuna are captured.'

75. Hearing, supra note 13, at 115.
76. Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 10.
77. Must Try Harder,supra note 74.
78. Martinez, supra note 41.
79. BOCKISTAEL & STRAND, supra note 17, at 12.
80. Cecilia Rodriguez, Save the Dolphins,but Remember Mexican Needs, Too, L. A. TIMES, Jan.
13, 1991, at M2.
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Thus, by threatening the economic status of the Mexican tuna industry,
tuna embargoes also endanger domestic supplies of this vital product. In
this way, U.S. standards are arguably not applicable to the realities of life
in a less developed country.8.
In addition to the nutritional needs of poorer sectors, jobs also
depend on the tuna industry. By 1990, Mexico had the largest and most
modern tuna fleet in the world. Tuna-fishing is a valuable source of jobs
and foreign currency. In an underemployed workforce, tuna-fishing
sustains about 400,000 people, including workers and their dependents.
By threatening the financial stability of the Mexican tuna industry,
continued U.S. embargoes have the potential to cause job loss. In
addition, were Mexico to move the entire fishing industry to the WTP, it
could cause hardship for workers and upset the balance of regionally
located industry in Mexico.82
Asymmetries Are Ignored
The anger that Mexicans feel over these U.S. threats to Mexican
jobs and the economy as a whole is enhanced by the feeling that the U.S.
laws are unjust. In a nutshell, many Mexicans feel that U.S. congresspersons appear to have forgotten that Mexico does not share the same
financial resources as the United States.
The U.S. tuna industry has the excess capital available to update
its fleet and pay to move it to the WTP. The cost is then passed on to the
U.S. tuna consumer through price increases. In contrast, the Mexican fleet
does not have such resources immediately on hand. As David Clark
Scott, journalist for The Christian Science Monitor, writes, "What bothers
Mexican officials is that the U.S., by virtue of its market size, can
single-handedly force a poor nation to comply with costly ecological
standards set by the U.S. Congress.'
United States legislation also ignores the fact that the United
States contributed to tremendous dolphin-death rates in previous years,
which caused the initial concern about dolphin-population conservation.
In 1972, the United States killed 368,000 dolphins while all other non-U.S.
vessels killed 55,000 in total. As a result of these statistics, many Mexicans
feel that "The U.S. is one of the world's greatest environmental predators-from creating acid rain to fouling the Colorado River-with what
moral authority can it pretend to the throne of ecological protection? ""
Therefore, it is argued, like so many of the environmental issues of today,
81. Id

82. Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 11.
83. Scott, supra note 7, at 6.
84. Rodriguez, supra note 80, at M3.
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the less developed nations are called upon to solve a problem originally
caused by the advanced industrial nations. Nonetheless, the notion of
providing developing countries with some leeway on early environmental
legislation to account for vastly unequal contribution to the problem is
entirely absent from related U.S. legislation.8
U.S. Protectionism
For many Mexicans, U.S. policies appear to be spurred more by
economics than by environmental concerns. Primary and secondary
embargoes blocked Mexico from the market just as the Mexican industry
began to flourish. Many Mexican fishermen therefore feel that the United
States is trying to create a virtual monopoly for its tuna: "Now that
Mexico's fleet is big enough to take market share from the U.S. industry,
protectionist barriers suddenly go up."* The strong degree of animosity
felt by many Mexicans over this issue is reflected in the words of a
Mexican columnist: "The defense of economic interests is disguised by the
flag of environmentalism just as U.S. military interventionism is disguised
as a democratic crusade."87
There is some validity to these statements; the embargoes clearly
create advantageous market conditions for U.S. harvesters. However, the
United States currently imports more than 66 percent of its tuna, hardly
a monopoly for domestic harvesters.' Most likely, the embargoes are a
result of both economic and environmental concerns.
An Issue of Sovereignty
Another debate that is not clear-cut is the disagreement over the
fundamental rights of citizens and nations to demand and implement
laws that directly affect the practices of other nations. Staunch environmentalists within the United States have argued that U.S. citizens have
a right to "consumer sovereignty," defined as the right of consumers to
decide what they want to consume. This includes the decision not to eat
"dolphin-unfriendly tuna" and the right to impose embargoes on
consumer imports. On the other hand, Mexicans see the sovereignty issue
from a different angle.' Over the course of history, Mexico has lost
more than half of its land to the United States. Mexicans are understand-

85. Eduardo Viola, Class Lecture at Stanford University (Feb. 7, 1994).
86. Scott, supra note 7, at 6.
87. Rodriguez, supra note 80, at M2.
88. BOCKSTAEL & STRAND, supra note 17, at 5.

89. Hilary French, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series, NAFTA and the
Environment: The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994).
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ably sensitive to further infringement on their sovereignty by the United
States.90
Sz~kely argues that Mexico's only defense against sovereignty
violations is the law. He believes that a principle of international equality
permits one country to impose its sovereignty on another only by mutual
agreement. In other words, there must be "consent to be bound" by
international law. 'The United States and Mexico have not, through any
instrument, made any agreement on the dolphin issue." Sz~kely also
emphasizes that making something legal in the U.S. system does not
make it legal in the system of international law. Rather, he calls for
defined mutual rights and obligations, instead of forcing Mexico to "shut
up on its legal arguments." Thus, many Mexicans such as Szdkely regret
the abandonment of a legal defense to support the GATT decision against
the United States." A statement by Javier Rosado, a Mexican citizen,
best sums up the feelings of Mexicans: "Mexico believes in the force of
law and the United States believes in the law of force.' .
The Cost to Mexico
Economic costs to Mexico add to the tension. The embargoes have
created obstacles to the continued financial success of Mexican tuna
harvesters. While in 1990 Mexico was able to sell the "U.S. share" of its
tuna to Japan for the same price it received from U.S. canneries, financial
losses occurred in subsequent years. In 1991, a spokesperson for the
Mexican Fisheries Ministry announced that the U.S. embargo on Mexican
tuna exports caused a total US $7.77 million in lost revenue.93 Continued
embargoes have the potential to wreak havoc on the Mexican tuna-fishing
industry.
GATT FAILED
Clearly, the perspective of the Mexican government and tuna
industry is vastly different from the views of those who support
continued embargoes. However, those sharing the Mexican perspective
agree that the GATT dispute-settlement panel failed to adequately resolve
this debate. The GATT ruling ignores the asymmetries of the political
relationship between the United States and Mexico. Mexico is not in a

90. Rodriguez, supra note 80, at M2.
91. Szkely, supra note 47.
92. Javier Rosado, Address at the North America Forum Lecture Series, NAFTA and the
Environment: The Tuna-Dolphin Conflict at Stanford University (Apr. 5, 1994).
93. Update on U.S. Embargo on Mexican Tuna Exports & Related Developments, SOURcEMEX,
Mar. 4, 1992, available in WFSTLAW, SMXECON Database, File No. 1992 WL 2396904.
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place to antagonize the United States when the costs of doing so could
have repercussions for the rest of their economic dealings. GATT ruled
in favor of Mexico in an effort to destroy unnecessary barriers to trade,
but Mexico cannot possibly pursue the ruling without tremendous costs.
President Salinas effectively defused this explosive issue by ignoring the
GATT ruling. Thus, Mexicans undoubtedly believe that the GATT panel
decision is an unacceptable resolution to the tuna-dolphin dispute.
Why GAIT Failed
The GATT conflict-resolution panel has left all of the various
actors in the tuna-dolphin conflict dissatisfied. One of the reasons for the
failure of this traditional form of conflict-resolution is obvious after
examining the polar perspectives of the parties involved. The GATT panel
deliberations on the tuna-dolphin dispute did not incorporate a full
understanding of the differences between Mexico and the United States.
The second major cause for the failure of the GATT dispute-settlement process was that it did not include new policy actors in
its deliberation process. The recent globalization of policy issues has
created new alliances that cut across national boundaries. As a result,
governments of nation-states are no longer the only important parties to
policy disputes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) must also play
a part in any dispute-resolution process.
The number of NGOs worldwide has increased steadily in recent
years. By the early 1980s there were approximately 13,000 environmental
non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) in developed countries and an
estimated 2,230 in developing countries, with numbers significantly
increasing ever since.9 These actors represent a large portion of the
world population, and their political influence is great:
A distinctive characteristic of environmental politics is the
importance of public opinion and nonprofit NGOs, especially
environmental NGOs, that are both national and international
in scope. Environmental issues, like human-rights issues before
them, have mobilized the active political interest of large
numbers of citizens in key countries, including shifts in policy
that helped turn the tide in a number of environmental issues.
Public opinion, channeled through electoral politics and
NGOs, has had a substantial, if not decisive influence on the
outcomes of global bargaining ....

94. PORTER &
95. Id. at 19.

BROWN, supra

note 4, at 56.
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Total membership in U.S. national environmental organizations is now
13 million." These groups are obviously a force with which to contend.
GATT, however, does not formally recognize this "new actor" on the
political scene:
Because NGOs are not permitted to participate in GATT
meetings, no environmentalists or environmental specialists
have ever been involved, even as observers, in the various
rounds of GATT negotiations, nor have delegations to the
negotiations included environmental specialists.'
Given the failure of GATT to accept input from all of the various parties
to the tuna-dolphin conflict, its dispute-settlement mechanism is
incapable of adequately resolving international trade and environmental
disputes.
Solutions
Several possible strategies exist to correct the failure of the GATT
dispute-settlement panel. The most obvious is to amend the GATT so as
to allow it to encompass a broader set of actors. Although some of these
changes are already in motion, redefining the rules of a major international organization is a complicated and time-consuming process, as
demonstrated through the lengthy negotiation process that has characterized the GATT in recent years." As Hilary French of WorldWatch
Institute suggests:
There have been calls for the negotiation of a GATT environmental code, perhaps through a "green round" of GATT to
clarify what to do in cases where trade and the environment
collide. If the length of the interminable Uruguay Round is
any guide, however, revised rules could be quite some time in
coming."
Porter and Brown concur with this statement and add that "changes in
the GATT will come with difficulty, since they must be negotiated and

96. Id. at 57.
97. Id. at 135.
98. The Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations ended on December 15,1993. Historically,
much time has elapsed between GATT rounds. The Uruguay Round began in 1986 and took
seven years to complete, and the previous negotiations ended in 1979. GATT Comes Right,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1993, at 13.
99. Hilary F. French, Reconciling Trade and the Environment, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1993:
A WORLDWATCH INSTITUTE REPORT ON PROGRESS TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE SOCIETY 158,176
(Linda Starke ed., 1993).
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approved by more than 110 nations, most of which are far more
interested in opening markets than in reconciling trade with environmental protection."' °°
A second option for resolving the present impasse would be to
attempt to form a regional multilateral convention on the tuna-dolphin
issue. However, at this stage of the conflict, when Mexican dolphin kills
have already diminished substantially, an independent international
agreement likely would take far too much time and effort to implement,
especially when endangered species could stand to benefit even more
from such efforts.
Amending an already existing international agreement is another
possibility that has been investigated. However, after analyzing the
Proposed Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS),"01 the International
Whaling Commission (IWC), 1°2 the Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species (CITES),"rs and the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission (IATTC),' ° Stephen Boreman found that only the IATTC
is a viable candidate for amendment to remedy the tuna-dolphin
controversy. All of the others exclude or are not applicable to the
tuna-dolphin controversy. Although LOS provides a "broad constitutional
framework for developing a regional option," it does not provide for the
specific protection of species."is In principle, IWC could regulate
dolphin kills, but has chosen to limit its focus to whale protection, while
CITES is inappropriate to this debate because dolphins are not an
endangered species.
Boreman's analysis of the first three agreements listed is accurate,
but his conclusion that the IATTC can solve this conflict may be flawed.
His suggestions for amendments to the IATTC are laudable, including a
call for a termination of all purse seining, mandatory observers on all
tuna-fishing fleets, and enforcement through the threat of sanctions in the
form of the denial of the right to fish in certain Exclusive Economic

100. World Wildlife Foundation, Questions and Answers on NAFTA 10 (1993).
101. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/122, U.N Sales No. E.83 V.5 (1983).
102. The IWC was created by treaty. International Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72.
103. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora,
Convention done Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
104. The IATTC was created by treaty to make recommendations to member governments
concerning the exploitation of tuna in the eastern Pacific, Convention for the Establishment
of an Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, May 31, 1949, U.S.-Costa Rica, 1 U.S.T.
231, 80 U.N.T.S. 3.
105. Stephen M. Boreman, Dolphin-Safe Tuna: What's in a Label?, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J.425,
439 (1992).
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Zones (the waters 200 miles off shore of each nation))Ys However, there
are three problems with his solution. First, while several of his suggestions have been implemented since he first proposed them, none has
proven sufficient and the conflict continues. For example, the United
States has unilaterally called for a global moratorium on purse seining
nets and there are currently observers on every boat of the Mexican fleet
in the ETP. Neither of these realities has solved the problem of dolphin
kills. Second, his recommendations do not suggest a cooperative,
give-and-take solution among the relevant actors. Rather, his solutions
tend to imply that embargoed nations should yield to those policies that
staunch U.S. environmentalists favor. This one-sided approach seems
unlikely to produce consensus on amendments to the IATTC. Finally, as
even Boreman himself notes, while the IATTC was originally signed in
1949 by the United States, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Japan, Mexico,
Panama, Vanuatu, and Venezuela, in subsequent years Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Vanuatu, and Venezuela have opted out. Thus, the
main parties to the tuna-dolphin dispute are not currently parties to the
IATrC.' 7
A third possibility is simply to ignore the tuna-dolphin conflict
and hope that it goes away. Currently, the tuna-dolphin debate is not a
particularly hot issue in the press. Although the embargoes continue and
Mexico has made a concerted effort to decrease its dolphin kill rate, other
debates have grabbed the attention of environmentalists, government
officials, and individuals in both nations. Conceivably, this debate could
be left as it stands and slowly "fade off' of the policy agenda. Over time,
however, it is likely to resurface as it is indicative of the type of problem
that will arise as the number of international trade agreements escalates.
Eventually, a reasonable means of solving trade and environmental
conflicts must be institutionalized.
In addition, this debate may make its way back into the public
eye through one of several additional channels. First, it could serve as a
useful issue for Ernesto Zedillo, the President of Mexico, to show the
public that he is not merely an unfeeling technocrat, but rather a
nationalist who will defend his country when it is threatened by
unilateral U.S. action. Now that NAFTA has passed, Mexican officials
could return to the GATT to ask that the tuna-dolphin panel decision be
implemented."° Alternatively, the European Economic Community
(EEC) raised the secondary tuna embargoes before the GATT dispute-resolution panel, calling them an unfair barrier to market liberalization, and
106. Id. at 442-47.
107. Id. at 440-41.
108. Interview with John Wirth, Professor of History, Stanford University, in Palo Alto,
CA (Apr. 7, 1994).
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a panel report was issued on May 20, 1994. The decision in favor of the
EEC on "dolphin-unsafe" tuna exported from Mexico and other nations
to Europe, packaged, and re-exported to the United States further
angered environmentalists. The ruling was based on a somewhat different
analysis of the relevant GATT text; however, it is equally or more
offensive to environmentalists thus ensuring that the tuna-dolphin issue
will not be forgotten in future debates."0' Finally, as a result of concern
over the GATT ruling stating that process standards may not be used to
impede trade, these standards are slated for discussion by the NAFTA
Free Trade Council."' This formal review process will ensure that the
tuna-dolphin issue is eventually brought back into the limelight.
NAFTA is an institution already in place and it can meet the
challenge of resolving this conflict without extensive delay. The next
section examines the weaknesses in the NAFTA instrument that hinder
resolution of the tuna-dolphin dispute and then explains how these
hurdles can be overcome. We will see that NAFTA is not the "lost
opportunity" to reconcile environmental protection and free trade that
many have suggested.'
IS NAFTA THE ANSWER?
With the huge debate raging between advocates of free trade and
proponents of environmental issues, it is hard to believe that NAFTA is
actually the first international trade agreement to specifically incorporate
provisions for environmental protection." 2 The signing of NAFTA in
1993 is clearly a preCedent-setting accomplishment in this regard. A
memo of the World Wildlife Foundation, an-environmental organization
that supported the passage of NAFTA, explains that:
Trade has an enormous impact on the planet's ecological
health yet trade agreements have always been actively hostile
to environmental protection ... NAFTA's passage will ensure
that future trade negotiations, including those on the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), follow suit [in
incorporating environmental interests]."
With other developing countries in Latin America lining up to discuss the
possibility of creating trade-liberalizing agreements with the United States

109.
110.
Ill.
112.
113.

Phillips, supra note 44.
14.
Id.
World Wildlife Foundation, supra note 100, at 3.
World Wildlife Foundation, Why WWF Supports NAFTA: Talking Points 1 (1993).
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and of signing onto NAFTA, the precedent-setting powers of NAFTA
only grow.
The tuna-dolphin issue is not specifically addressed in NAFTA,
"but it can be argued that the prospect of NAFTA has encouraged the
Mexicans to make real progress in dolphin protection and that the
Commission on Environmental Cooperation (CEC) holds out a real
possibility of doing something important to further such protection in the
medium term." 4 This section analyzes the potential of the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, more commonly
know as the environmental side agreement to NAFTA, '1 to adequately
resolve the tuna-dolphin controversy. It outlines the obstacles to settlement of the tuna-dolphin conflict created by the environmental dispute-settlement apparatus, suggests a means to avoid these barriers, and
proposes a plan for ultimately resolving this conflict through utilization
of the Council established within the CEC.
Obstacles to Solving the Tuna-Dolphin Controversy within NAFTA
The preamble of the side agreement stresses that the parties to
the agreement (the governments of the United States, Mexico, and
Canada) are to be dedicated to environmental protection and sustainability.Y6 To further this objective, the side agreement creates the CEC
which is comprised of a Council, a Secretariat, and a Joint Public
Advisory." 7 Within the CEC apparatus, Part Five of the side agreement
creates a structure for the "consultation and resolution of disputes." While
the dispute-settlement apparatus created in Part Five has many notable
improvements over the GATT dispute panel, the NAFTA environmental
dispute-resolution procedures alone cannot solve the tuna-dolphin
dilemma.
Article 22, which covers the implementation of dispute-settlement
procedures, explains that "Any Party may request, in writing, consultations with any other Party regarding whether there has been a persistent
pattern of failure by that other Party to effectively enforce its environmental law."'18 In analyzing this statement, the italicized words take on
primary importance. The word "its" dictates that the dispute-settlement
apparatus is to involve only issues relating to one party's enforcement of
its own domestic legislation within its territory. The tuna-dolphin issue

114. Id. at 9.

115. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13,1993,32 I.L.N.
1480 [hereinafter Side Agreement].
116. Id. at pmbl.
117. Id. pt. III, §§ A, B, & C.
118. Id. art. 22.1 (emphasis added).
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is immediately excluded from this process because it involves a controversy over U.S. laws and Mexican fishing practices. Thus, those cases
where one country is trying to impose its unilateral laws on another are
beyond the scope of the NAFTA dispute-settlement structure.
Further, any loophole that might be found to let the tuna-dolphin
issue slip into the dispute-resolution structure is closed by the second and
third words italicized above. Article 45 of the side agreement indicates
that the definition of "environmental law" "does not include any statute
or regulation, or provision thereof, the primary purpose of which is
managing the commercial harvest or exploitation, or subsistence or
aboriginal harvesting, of natural resources."119 This means that no
management laws, such as fishery-management legislation, can be
considered by the environmental dispute-settlement apparatus of NAFTA.
The tuna-dolphin issue falls within the periphery of tuna-management
laws, and is thereby inappropriate for NAFTA environmental dispute-resolution procedures under the side agreement.
Finally, NAFTA shares the same process-standards regulations as
GATT. Although these standards as currently stated are a topic listed for
future discussion by the parties, their present status suggests that if the
tuna-dolphin conflict were brought to the dispute-settlement panel, the
subsequent ruling might be the same as the extant GATT ruling."2
For all of these reasons, the dispute-settlement apparatus is
clearly not the place for solution of this issue. It simply does not have the
authority to make a binding ruling.
NAFTA as a Solution to the Tuna-Dolphin Conflict
Fortunately, there is much more to the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation than dispute-settlement. As
illustrated in this section, the CEC established within the side agreement
provides the necessary framework for a resolution of the tuna-dolphin
conflict by overcoming the problems of the GATT apparatus. This section
of NAFTA does not limit the range of issues that can be discussed to the
extent that the NAFTA environmental dispute-resolution provisions do.
Rather, NAFITA and the CEC include commitments to increased
environmental protection and cooperation on environmental issues, an
opening of procedures to the public, and the incorporation of NGOs and
non-governmental persons into the discussion process, all of which are
conducive to providing a framework for solving this dispute.

119. Id. art. 45.2(b) (emphasis added).
120. French, supra note 89.
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First, it must be established that the tuna-dolphin conflict is not
excluded from all structures of the side agreement. The Council created
within the CEC serves as "a forum for the discussion of environmental
matters within the scope of the Agreement," and it is this structure that
holds the potential for possible negotiations to end the tuna-dolphin
conflict.' The broad nature of the term "environmental matters"
suggests that any issue regarding the environment is acceptable for
discussion in this format. The more limiting term "environmental law,"
which excluded matters of fishery management in the above discussion,
is not used here.
Moreover, the phrase "scope of this Agreement" suggests that
there may be a certain established range of issues that can be discussed
in the Council. As this phrase is not defined later in the side agreement,
this term can be interpreted by returning to the preamble in which the
premises of the overall agreement are outlined. Here, the text explains
that, in this agreement, the parties are "Recalling their tradition of
environmental cooperation and expressing their desire to support and
build on international agreements and existing policies and laws, in order
to promote cooperation between them;.. . ."" This clause suggests that
virtually any concern or conflict that involves the environment (either
shared by the three countries and the world or within one of the nations)
is within the scope of this agreement. The tuna-dolphin conflict meets
these broad guidelines and therefore may be brought to the Council for
discussion.
NAFTA as a whole, and the side agreement specifically,
establishes a commitment to environmental protection and cooperation
that will provide an atmosphere beneficial to resolving the tuna-dolphin
controversy. The fact that a separate side agreement was drafted to deal
with environmental concerns is an indication of the priority environmental interests were given by the parties. This commitment is laid out in the
first lines of the preamble to the side agreement which states that the
parties are:
. . . CONVINCED of the importance of the conservation,
protection and enhancement of the environment in their
territories and the essential role of cooperation in these areas
in achieving sustainable development for the well-being of
present and future generations."

121. Side Agreement, supra note 115, at art. 10,1(a).
122. Id. at pmbl.
123. Id. at pmbl.
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The "Objectives" further elaborate on the agreement of the parties to
"promote economically efficient and effective environmental measures 124 and to "promote sustainable development.""z Shortly thereafter, the "Obligations" indicate that the parties must use "economic
instruments for the efficient achievement of environmental goals."'2
This recurring confirmation of commitment to environmental protection
runs throughout the agreement, establishing a common goal for all
discussions and a basis from which all negotiations can begin: environmental protection and sustainable development. Also, NAFTA commits
the parties to upward harmonization of their environmental laws:
Recognizing the right of each Party to establish its own levels
of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities, and to adopt or modify its
environmental laws and regulations, each Party shall ensure
that its laws and regulations provide for high levels of
environmental protection and shall strive to continue to
improve those laws and regulations." 7
Under this ruling, environmental protection laws may only be changed
to become more stringent. Thus, unlike GATT, which makes no reference
to the environment, NAF17A establishes environmental protection as the
common denominator of all arguments. With this priority established, the
parties have at least this one common standard from which to build
agreement.
Another factor that works in favor of NAFTA as a means of
helping to resolve this dispute is the shared desire on the part of various
international policy players in the tuna-dolphin conflict to reach
agreement. For example, Sz~kely speaks of the need to have agreement
on this issue rather than imposition of U.S. law on Mexico. He argues
that unilateral action that violates the sovereignty of one nation is never
legitimate. Indeed, he maintains that "Illegal unilateral U.S. embargoes
have kept us away. Since the embargoes began there have been no
United States-Mexico discussions on this matter."128 In addition, while
Hilary French of WorldWatch Institute and David Phillips of the Earth
Island Institute have disagreed with Szdkely on many issues, they have
both concurred on the need for agreement. 29 Thus, while the parties
have "officially" stopped discussing the tuna-dolphin conflict, NAFTA

124.
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Id. pt. I, art. 1(i).
Id. pt. I, art. 1(b).
Id. pt. II, art. 2(f).
Id. art. 3.
Sz~kely, supra note 47.
French, supra note 89; Phillips, supra note 44.
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provides an overarching goal of cooperation that mandates an end to this
silence.
This emphasis on cooperation is apparent throughout the NAFTA
text. Article 2003 is specifically dedicated to this subject. Here the parties
promise to "at all times endeavor to agree on the interpretation and
application of this Agreement, and shall make every attempt through
cooperation and consultation to arrive at a mutually satisfactory
resolution to any matter that might affect its operation."1' 3
The side agreement also contains repeated references to the need
for cooperation. The preamble provides the most explicit example by
stating that the parties are "CONVINCED of the benefits to be derived
from a framework, including a Commission, to facilitate effective
cooperation on the conservation, protection and enhancement of the
environment in their territories." 1 Detailing the Council functions, the
text states that the Council must "promote and facilitate cooperation
between the Parties with respect to environmental matters." 32 In
addition, "[tihe Council shall strengthen cooperation on the development
and continuing improvement of environmental laws and regulations."'This commitment to cooperation was strong enough to convince several
ENGOs in the United States that NAFTA would provide the cooperation
necessary to allow the parties to work together and resolve disagreements
in a manner that benefits the environment as a whole. A portion of the
outline circulated by the World Wildlife Foundation detailing the reasons
for that organization's support of NAFTA reads as follows:
....Fostering general cooperation between the parties. Such
cooperation is essential if the environmental community wants
to have a meaningful input into continent-wide environmental
problems. In particular the CEC, by legitimizing a
continent-wide approach to environmental issues, and the
creation of the Joint Public Advisory Committee, which should
permit direct access into continent-wide environmental
planning, should insure that such input and direct involvement occur.134
Thus, as all of these examples demonstrate, a framework of cooperation
has been established that will benefit attempts to resolve the tuna-dolphin
conflict.

130. NAFTA at 20-3.
131. Side Agreement, supra note 115, at pmbl.
132. Id. art. 10.1(0.
133. Id. art. 10.3.
134. World Wildlife Foundation, The NAFTA Environmental Agreements 8 (1993)
(memorandum by Kenneth Berlin & Jeffrey M. Lang).
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Another advantage of NAFTA over older trade agreements such
as GATT is that it opens the procedures of the environmental commission
to the public. The GATT dispute-resolution panel is made up of officials
unrelated to the conflicts, and it deliberates disputes in private. The CEC
Council positions are filled by nationals of Mexico, Canada, or the United
States-the parties directly involved in the matters for discussion. 135
Also, and "perhaps most important, the side agreement commits the three
countries to open, transparent deliberations and to making information
publicly available in line with the community right-to-know principle,
heretofore unique to the United States."" According to this principle,
the meetings of the Council are open to the public, 37 the Secretariat
may gather information for its annual reports through "public consultations such as conferences, seminars and symposia, " " and information
regarding the Council's activities is publicly available. ENGOs in the
United States, such as World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), have found
these provisions that encourage citizen comment, participation, and
information dissemination to be a vast improvement over GATT. Also,
as one WWF report states, the environmental law enforcement provisions
of the side agreement,
... when combined with the obligations of the nations to open
access to environmental decision documents and procedures,
to ensure private access to environmental remedies, and to
ensure that their administrative, quasi-judicial or judicial
procedures are fair, open and equitable.. . would ensure a
sea-change in how Mexico (and improvements in the way the
U.S. and Canada) develops, implements and enforces, its
environmental law. 3 9
This opening of virtually all processes related to environmental law
removes any element of suspicion from negotiations and decisions and
creates an atmosphere conducive to trust and compromise.
Finally, the most glaring weakness in the GATT apparatus with
respect to the tuna-dolphin dispute is also remedied in the NAFTA
structure. By not allowing ENGOs to be a part of any of its processes,
GATT is simply out of date. The international political arena of today is
different from the world system of 1947 when GATT was drafted. There
are a variety of powerful and diverse political players now that do not
always share the interests or priorities of the governments of their
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Side Agreement, supra note 115, art. 9.1.
World Wildlife Foundation, supra note 100, at 8.
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Id. art. 13.2(e).
World Wildlife Foundation, supra note 100, at 7.

Summer 19951

THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CONTROVERSY

countries. Given that government officials do not necessarily adequately
represent the interests of these groups in international agreements, the
groups themselves must be made a part of any negotiation process. The
NAFTA environmental side agreement allows for the incorporation of
non-governmental persons or groups in its procedures. With all of the
interested parties participating in a discussion of the tuna-dolphin
dispute, the atmosphere is ripe for agreement. Without all of the related
players actively involved in negotiations, an agreement that is satisfactory
to all is virtually impossible.
NGOs and non-governmental persons are incorporated into many
facets of the CEC. The Council has the right to assign responsibilities to
"ad hoc or standing committees, working groups or expert groups," and
to seek the advice of NGOs, persons, or independent experts who can
provide information or technical advice."" As well as seeking the
assistance of NGOs, the Council must try "to achieve the environmental
goals of NAFrA by acting as a point of inquiry and receipt for comments
from non-governmental organizations and persons concerning those goals
and objectives." 4 In addition, annual reports of the Secretariat of the
Council may be written with the expertise and information "submitted by
interested non-governmental organizations and persons. " " Now that
the ENGOs involved in the tuna-dolphin conflict are allowed to
participate and even instigate discussions of the Council, a mutually
agreeable solution can be reached through consideration of all of the facts
and perspectives on this case. Public participation will play a vital role
in this process.
By displaying repeated dedication to environmental protection
and cooperation, opening discussions and procedures to the public, and
incorporating all of the various policy actors in the debate over environmental concerns, NAFrA as a whole and the CEC in particular create
a framework optimal for the resolution of the tuna-dolphin conflict.
Policy Recommendations
The actual resolution to the tuna-dolphin conflict will take extensive negotiation. This section offers suggestions as to possible policy
changes that could produce one acceptable solution and explains why it
is in the interest of the parties to follow these recommendations. All
recommendations are based on the assumption that they will be

140. Side Agreement, supra note 115, at arts. 9.5(a), (b).
141. Id. art. 9.6.
142. Id. art. 13.2(b).
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negotiated within the Council of the CEC and the discussion structure it
encompasses 1 4
First, the United States should amend the International Dolphin
Conservation Act (IDCA) to allow for a two-year deferment of moratorium-based embargoes. In other words, embargoes should be lifted
immediately with the agreement that within two years of enacting the
deferment, Mexican vessels will have completely stopped encircling
dolphins and consequently will have a zero dolphin kill rate.
Second, Mexican boats should move to other waters in order to
catch tuna. We know that the Mexican tuna fleet has now met the
quota-based embargoes by diminishing its dolphin kill rates. It has not,
however, completely stopped encircling dolphins with purse-seine nets
to become "dolphin-safe." Some of the Mexican boats are now 100 percent
dolphin-safe, while others set on dolphins approximatelyhalf of the time.
The Mexican ETP tuna fleet recently contained about 50 boats. Twelve of
these boats were sold to Ecuador, which is now dolphin-safe by law. That
leaves approximately 38 boats in the ETP, about 18 more than can
profitably fish on schools of tuna, rather than dolphins. These 18 boats
should move to other waters, such as the WTP.'"
While it seems unlikely that Mexican fishermen would want to
agree to this proposal, there are two large incentives for cooperation.
First, the added costs accruing from longer fishing trips and the
possibility of catching fewer fish would be overcome by the benefits of
access to the lucrative U.S. market as well as broader international
markets. Second, if the tuna-dolphin controversy continues in its present
form and U.S. legislation becomes more stringent, problems would arise
that would increasingly hinder the Mexican fleet from operating
profitably while fishing on dolphins. A current example is the provision
of the IDCA that makes it a criminal offense for any U.S. citizen to
partake in encircling dolphins, regardless of where this action takes place.
Numerous Mexican tuna vessels have U.S. captains, while a great number
of the helicopters used to spot dolphins trapped in the purse-seine nets
during encircling are piloted by U.S. citizens. These expertly trained
pilots would be difficult to replace. While one case has already been filed
in a U.S. court to argue against the legality of these provisions," legal
battles tend to be long, and the Mexican vessels still encircling dolphins

143. I am grateful to David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute, for
providing a great deal of the information in this section. However, none of the suggestions
made here should be considered to necessarily represent his views.
144. Interview with David Phillips, Executive Director of Earth Island Institute, in Palo
Alto, CA (Apr. 22, 1994).

145. Sabella v. United States, 863 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994) (case dismissed for lack of
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would suffer in the meantime, regardless of the ultimate outcome of any
court cases.1" This is just one example of the increasing barriers the
Mexican fleets will encounter as U.S. laws become stricter, and Mexican
boats continue to encircle dolphins. An agreement would avoid the need
to fight this battle to the bitter end.
The second prong of this policy recommendation involves
compensation to the Mexican fleet for the costs of converting boats to be
equipped for fishing on schools of tuna (or floating objects), rather than
dolphins. There are two options here, and the optimal one can only be
selected through intensive negotiations. First, the United States could
offer a technology-assistance grant to the Mexican fleet equal to the cost
of converting the boat equipment' Costs of relocating the 18 boats to the
WTP would also be included in this grant. 47 Justification for such a
grant from the U.S. government would be offered on the grounds of
"historical equity," or the idea that the U.S. government should pay a
greater price for remedying the problem, particularly when it is partially
responsible for the problem to begin with, and is demanding that a
developing country meet U.S.-imposed restrictions.
A second possibility would be a loan to the Mexican tuna fleet
from the World Bank to cover the costs of changing equipment and
moving boats to the WTP. As the World Bank is usually interested in
encouraging developing countries to privatize their industries, the
Mexican government could agree to sell off any tuna boats they still own
in return for a loan." The U.S. government has great influence on
World Bank policy, and U.S. officials could surely help to arrange this
loan. Thus, with either of these options, Mexican fleets would not be
forced to produce capital they do not have to pay for modifications
mandated by the United States.
The incentives for the compromise explained above are numerous. Zedillo, the current president of Mexico, could benefit from a
compromise. Domestically, the Mexican president would look better if he
were portrayed as a strong nationalist who stood up to the United States
and won, than by ignoring the issue or returning to the GATT to ask for
enforcement of the panel ruling. In particular, Zedillo's reputation as a
technocrat would benefit from his involvement in this emotionally
charged issue.
Moreover, by ending dolphin kills, the Mexicans would appear
to be upholding their commitment to environmental improvement, which
has been questioned by U.S. ENGOs and the international community as
146. See supra note 144.
147. Id.
148. Personal Discussion with Clint Smith, Executive Director of the North America
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a whole. Many worry that now that NAFTA has been passed, Mexican
dedication to environmental improvement will wane. An agreement on
the tuna-dolphin conflict could prove this conjecture unfounded. In
addition, the number of environmentally aware Mexicans has been
growing recently and, while they have not sided with the U.S. ENGOs on
this issue, they will undoubtedly be pleased to see the killing of dolphins
stopped. Finally, Mexican tuna suppliers would gain access to the
lucrative U.S. tuna market and become more competitive tuna suppliers
throughout the international arena. Market expansion could strengthen
the Mexican tuna industry and the economy as a whole with added
foreign exchange.
There are also many incentives for agreement for the various U.S.
parties to the dispute. Just as the Bush Administration did not want to
antagonize the Mexicans at a time when the United States and Mexico
were becoming increasingly interdependent, the Clinton Administration
would undoubtedly be pleased to see the conclusion of this conflict as
well. In turn, environmentalists within the United States who feel that the
embargoes are excessive at this point also would be pleased to see an
agreement reached ending dolphin kills and the embargoes. For those
U.S. ENGOs that supported the embargoes, their goal of zero dolphin
kills would be achieved in a guaranteed two years, resulting in fewer
than 20,000 more dolphin kills. 49 With this issue settled, the money
presently spent on efforts to force Mexico to become dolphin-safe could
be spent on protecting other species in more immediate danger of
extinction.
Cooperation will benefit all. Dolphins, of course, will be the
greatest benefactors of this agreement, for they are most directly impacted
by this change in policy.
CONCLUSION
Today, dolphin-safe labels on tuna cans in the United States are
so common as to go virtually unnoticed. But they represent a conflict that
cannot and should not be overlooked. Trade and environmental issues
must be harmonized, and the tuna-dolphin conflict is the ideal place to
begin this process.
As is common with environmental and trade disputes, the
tuna-dolphin conflict involves a vast array of policy actors who bring
divergent perspectives to the bargaining table. They all, however, agree
on one thing: the ineptitude of the GATT mechanism for dispute-settlem-

149. This is based on estimated world dolphin kill rates for 1993. Mexico's rate is only
a portion of this total. Gilbreath, supra note 18, at 10.
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ent in effectively ending this disagreement. By not considering the
different histories, priorities, and sensitivities of two nations at very
different levels of economic development, the GATT ruling has failed to
adequately reconcile the various views. More importantly, by ignoring
the potent political force of environmental non-governmental organizations (ENGOs) that have grown'in power and number during the
globalization of policy issues in recent years, the GATT dispute-resolution
mechanism is out of date. ENGOs must be made a part of any effective
dispute-settlement mechanism or discussion process.
The tuna-dolphin conflict is no longer the most salient issue in
the news, but it will not remain long on the periphery of international
policy debate. It will return to center stage in the international arena by
one or more of the following means: if the newly elected president of
Mexico selects it as an issue for his new administration; when related
disputes reference this conflict; and/or when process standards are
reviewed as one of the issues targeted for discussion within the NAFTA
structures. A solution to the tuna-dolphin dilemma must be sought, for
neither this specific conflict nor environmental versus trade disputes as
a whole is likely to disappear. From shared border problems to issues of international immigration, the United States and Mexico are becoming increasingly interlinked.
NAFTA is clearly the most tangible evidence of this growing interdependence, but trade liberalization does not happen alone. It is tied to issues
of environmental degradation and the need to preserve the global
commons. By creating the CEC, the parties to NAFTA have recognized
that a continent-wide approach to environmental protection is mandatory
and that no contemporary trade agreement should ignore this need.
NAFTA represents the first "green" international trade agreement
in the world's history and provides an excellent structure for solving the
tuna-dolphin conflict. Though the tuna-dolphin conflict is effectively
excluded from the NAFTA environmental dispute-settlement mechanism,
the structure for discussion of environmental issues established within the
CEC provides an optimal atmosphere for compromise and agreement. If
utilized to its fullest extent, the CEC can serve as a precedent for
greening future trade liberalizing agreements. The CEC establishes a
Council where environmental issues are to be discussed. Discussion,
cooperation, and agreement are more appropriate to this multifaceted
debate than a panel ruling.
In addition, the problems inherent to the GATT structure are
remedied in the Council procedures. NAFTA as a whole, and the CEC
specifically, include commitments to increased environmental protection
and cooperation on environmental issues; an opening of procedures to
the public; and the incorporation of NGOs and any non-governmental
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person or group in the discussion process. These features create an
atmosphere conducive to agreement.
A solution will take extensive negotiation and compromise. First,
there should be an amendment creating a two-year deferment of
moratorium-based embargoes mandated by the International Dolphin
Conservation Act. By the end of the two-year period, Mexican fleets
would completely stop setting nets on dolphins. In return for this
concession, Mexican tuna harvesters would be provided with the capital
necessary to change their equipment to promote fishing on tuna schools
instead of dolphins, and for the cost of moving boats to the WTP. The
funds should come in the form of a grant from the U.S. government or
as a loan from the World Bank.
To date, unilateral action alone has not saved dolphins from
incidental death caused by drowning in purse seine nets. It is time that
a multilateral approach be institutionalized to solve trade and environmental disputes like the tuna-dolphin conflict. With the commitment to
international cooperation and environmental protection it outlines,
NAFTA provides a framework for multilateral negotiations and a
multisectoral solution to the tuna-dolphin controversy.

